The Rise of Cloud in the Ground Segment

Cloud adoption in the space sector is expanding at speed. By moving key ground functions into the cloud, satellite operators gain flexibility and efficiency while lowering the barrier to entry for smaller players. Shared ground stations and cloud APIs allow seamless handovers between globally distributed sites, enabling longer communication windows and more efficient mission management.

For new entrants and smaller companies, GSaaS offers a chance to compete without the heavy capital investment in antennas and infrastructure. For larger providers, cloud models allow optimisation of resources and the ability to monetise downtime by offering capacity to multiple users.

But this convenience comes at a price. As more systems connect to cloud platforms, the attack surface expands, creating new risks that space operators cannot afford to ignore.

Opportunities and Risks

The advantages of GSaaS are clear: cost savings, scalability, resilience, and operational agility. Yet the integration of cloud services introduces vulnerabilities that differ sharply from those of legacy systems. Where older ground stations relied on security through obscurity and limited connectivity, cloud-enabled platforms are exposed to a much broader threat landscape.

A key issue lies in the sector’s uneven cybersecurity maturity. Larger providers — often under government or military contracts — typically follow robust security practices. Smaller operators, however, may lack the resources or expertise to match this level of protection. This creates weak points in the ecosystem that sophisticated adversaries can exploit.

Legacy systems also complicate the picture. Many satellites and ground station technologies were never designed with modern cybersecurity in mind. When connected to cloud systems, they risk exposing outdated protocols and insecure interfaces, making them easy targets.

Nation-State Adversaries and Insider Threats

The report highlights that nation-states and advanced persistent threats (APTs) are among the most serious risks facing cloud-integrated ground systems. These actors have both the capability and the motivation to compromise satellite operations, whether for espionage, disruption, or strategic advantage.

Insider threats compound this problem. Antenna operators, GSaaS providers, or even satellite operators themselves may misuse legitimate access to disrupt services or steal sensitive data. In a shared cloud environment, where trust and isolation are critical, effective authentication, separation of duties, and anomaly detection are essential safeguards.

The Challenge of Investigation

From a digital investigations perspective, the shift to cloud raises difficult questions. Multi-tenant platforms blur accountability, making it harder to determine who is responsible for securing which parts of the system. Forensic investigations often rely on access to detailed logs, but these may sit under the control of third-party cloud providers. Jurisdictional issues add another layer of complexity, especially when data is stored or processed overseas.

For the sector to respond effectively to incidents, it must adopt forensic readiness. This includes:

• Cryptographically verifiable audit trails
• Secure and transparent logging practices
• Continuous monitoring for anomalies
• International agreements to support cross-border data access

Without these capabilities, both prevention and response efforts risk falling short.

Supply Chain Risks and Long-Term Viability

Supply chain vulnerabilities represent another serious concern. The lack of robust verification for software libraries and hardware components opens the door to tampering long before systems are deployed. Meanwhile, the highly specialised nature of GSaaS provision means the sector relies on a small pool of providers. This creates risks of dependency, vendor lock-in, and systemic vulnerabilities.

There are also questions about long-term viability. Cloud platforms evolve quickly, but satellite missions often span decades. Forced upgrades or discontinued services could leave operators exposed, undermining security and resilience over time.

Towards Forensic-Ready Resilience

Despite these challenges, the report underscores that cloud integration can strengthen resilience if implemented correctly. Hybrid architectures, redundancy across providers, and distributed ground stations reduce reliance on single points of failure. Strong authentication, end-to-end encryption, and well-defined responsibility frameworks can further mitigate risks.

For digital investigators and defenders alike, the priority must be to ensure that innovation in the space sector is matched by innovation in security practices. This means embedding forensic readiness into systems from the start, ensuring that evidence is available, trustworthy, and actionable when incidents occur.

Conclusion

The move to cloud-enabled ground systems is inevitable — but it is not without risk. As the UK government’s research shows in Cyber risks of cloud computing in the ground segment of the space sector, the decisions made today will shape the resilience of satellite operations for years to come. Success will depend on a combination of strong technical controls, clear responsibility frameworks, government support, and international collaboration.

For the space sector, the message is clear: cloud adoption must go hand in hand with security maturity. Only then can the promise of GSaaS be realised without compromising the safety, reliability, and trustworthiness of critical space infrastructure.